We consider a series of finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games in which we manipulate subjects' beliefs about their opponent's type. By raising the probability that a player will have an altruistic opponent, we increase the benefits to reputation building. Of course, if subjects really do have altruistic preferences, then we cannot completely control the homemade priors that subjects may bring to the experiment from outside. Therefore, we also include a control group that plays repeated single-shots of prisoner dilemma, and thus has no opportunity to build reputations. By comparing this group to the others, we are able to measure the effect of reputation building over 'homemade altruism', that is, people's natural tendency to cooperate.
The result is that the sequential equilibrium reputation model appears to be a good predictive model of cooperative behaviour in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. Subjects seem to undertake significant efforts to build reputations for altruism. However, we also find that those reputations are welldeserved. In the group that cannot build reputations, we find a consistent pattern of cooperation that does not deteriorate, even after 200 single shots of the prisoner's dilemma. Hence, there clearly appears to be a significant number of 'altruistic types' in the population. This finding is consistent with evidence from other social sciences. For instance, in a detailed analysis of prisoner's dilemma experiments, psychologists Kelley and Stahelski (I970) conclude, 'There are two stable types of individuals which may be described approximately as cooperative and competitive personalities' (p. 66).5 These cooperative or altruistic players appear to form the basis for reputation building. While in theory all that is required for cooperation is sufficient beliefs that altruists exist, in practice such beliefs appear to be consistent with actual tastes for cooperation. repeated prisoner's dilemma in which two rational players both believe that there is a small probability, 8, that the other is 'irrational'. They give two examples of irrationality. First, the opponent may be playing a tit-for-tat strategy, which begins by cooperating, and then plays whatever its opponent played on the last round. Second, players could believe the opponent may get extra utility from mutual cooperation, such that cooperation is the best response to cooperation. In each case, a sufficiently high a can lead each player to adopt a strategy of the sort 'cooperate until round T, or until my opponent defects, and defect thereafter'. Higher values of 8 will tend to increase the amount of cooperation. A strict interpretation of the Kreps et al. theory is that no 'irrational' or 'altruistic' types need to exist, but only that there are sufficient beliefs that such types exist. This has been called the rationality hypothesis. It has been noted that this strict interpretation of the model requires players' beliefs about types to differ from the actual distribution of types (Samuelson, I987). Hence, the model would be more natural if some players actually were altruistic. This alternative has become known as the altruism or 'warm-glow' hypothesis, and has been suggested by many researchers.6 All of the alternative models of altruism can be viewed as one of, or some combination of, three similar models. In general, (i) and (ii) can support three equilibrium strategies in the single shot game, depending on the payoff parameters in the prisoner's dilemma. If people are altruistic, then one implication is that cooperation can be maintained in single-shot plays of the prisoner's dilemma, even without the possibility of reputation building. When we consider the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma with altruism, we also get a sequential equilibrium prediction that repeated play should increase cooperation. Unless there is common knowledge that everyone in the population has an a parameter that supports the cooperative equilibrium, then it may pay all subjects to build a reputation for being altruistic, but to defect late in the game. In this way, the sequential equilibrium predictions are the same for both altruistic and nonaltruistic populations. However, we should not expect all patterns of play to be independent of the degree of altruism. According to the rationality hypothesis as it becomes increasingly clear that the population is all 'rational', cooperation should become increasingly difficult to maintain. Hence, in a series of finitely repeated games, against a variety of opponents, defection should tend to occur earlier and earlier in each repeated game (Selton and Stoecker, I986). On the other hand, if people are altruistic, then as the true proportion of altruists becomes known one could observe cooperation extending until later and later, since altruistic subjects will become more confident that cooperation will be reciprocated.
The next section will outline the design of the experiment used to discuss reputation building, and will specify the hypotheses we will examine.
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II. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
This experiment was run with four conditions, each requiring I4 subjects.8 Subjects interacted over a computer network. Each subject participated in only one session, and each session ran only one condition. Subjects were randomly assigned to computer terminals at the start of the experiment. They were given written instructions, which were read aloud at the start of the session. Each session lasted less than go minutes, and subjects earned an average of $I I.65. All subjects were paid privately, in cash, at the end of the experiment. Subjects were recruited from introductory microeconomics courses at the University of Wisconsin. A copy of the subjects' instructions is included as an appendix to this paper. The four conditions are the following: I. Partners. The computer randomly paired the I4 subjects, and each subject played a I o-period repeated prisoner's dilemma with their partner. All pairings were anonymous. Subjects then received a summary of their earnings from the ten-period game. They were then randomly rematched with another partner for another io-period game. This was done for a total of 20 Io-period games, that is, for a total of 200 rounds of the prisoner's dilemma.
In the partners condition, subjects play a series of finitely repeated games, each time with a new partner. In every ten-period game, therefore, subjects can gain from reputation building. However, since there are only I4 subjects, as the experiment progresses subjects should get greater and greater knowledge about the true distribution of types. Under a hypothesis of no altruism, one would predict that with each io-period game cooperation should become harder to sustain, especially near the end of the experiment (Selten and Stoecker, I986). However, if there really are altruistic types, then a set pattern of cooperation can be sustained throughout the experiment. In fact, under altruism, cooperation could increase toward the end of the experiment as people become more certain that altruism will be reciprocated.
2. Strangers. The computer randomly paired the I4 subjects for every iteration of the prisoner's dilemma, for a total of 200 iterations. That is, each subject had a new partner every iteration. To make sure that there were no presentation differences between the strangers and the partners, subjects were also given summaries of their performance every Io rounds, as was done with the partners.
For strangers, there is no incentive for any one subject to build a reputation. Under a perfect rationality assumption, there should be no cooperation in this group, especially by the end of the experiment. Note, however, that the number of subjects is small relative to the number of rounds so it is not inconceivable that the group as a whole could build a reputation (Kandori, I992 If more cooperation is observed in the computer5o condition than in the partners condition, it could be that common knowledge of the tit-for-tat strategy, rather than changes in the probability of playing an altruist, could be influencing play. For this reason we also ran the computero condition, which is equivalent to computer5o except that subjects were told that the chance was approximately zero that they would actually play the computer. In this case, the tit-for-tat strategy was common knowledge, but the probability of playing an altruist was not (directly) increased. If common knowledge of the tit-for-tat strategy alone is sufficient to encourage altruism, then computeros should be more cooperative than partners.
During each iteration of the game subjects in each condition were told their last round decision, the decision of their opponent, and their earnings. They were also told how many rounds remained with their current partner (zero for strangers), and how many rounds remained in the experiment in total. All subjects were given a recap of their earnings every i o periods, and all terminals beeped at the recap. In addition, every time the computer randomly rematched the subjects, the words 'New Partner' flashed on the computer screen. Subjects were also given an option of reviewing all of their previous periods of play at any time by hitting a single key on the keyboard, and then paging up and down.
Subjects in all four conditions also participated in an unanticipated 'restart'. After all 200 rounds of the main experiment were complete, subjects were told that they would play an additional io-period game. For these ten periods the subjects were matched with a computer, player rather than another person, and the computer played the tit-for-tat strategy for sure. This was announced verbally to all subjects, and a description of the tit-for-tat strategy was written on a chalkboard for all subjects to see.
The purpose of the restart is to gauge the strategic sophistication of the subjects, independent of any altruism. The optimal strategy is to cooperate for 9 periods, and defect on the tenth. One might suspect that experience with the repeated game, and especially experience with tit-for-tat players, might increase a subject's ability to choose the optimal strategy when faced with the sure prospect of playing a computer using tit-for-tat. Hence, if subjects learn ( Royal Economic Society I993
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III. RESULTS
In this section we present evidence that the behaviour of subjects is consistent with the predictions of the sequential equilibrium reputation model. However, the data also suggests that, in addition to holding beliefs that a fraction of the population may be altruistic, a significant share of the subjects actually appear to be altruistic.
The Sequential Equilibrium Hypothesis Hence, simply making the tit-for-tat strategy common knowledge does not by itself appear to have any significant impact on cooperation.11 Finally, it is interesting to note that the average level of cooperation in the end-game, round I o, is virtually identical for partners, strangers, and computeros, and is only slightly higher for computer5os. This is also consistent with the sequential equilibrium hypothesis.
9 The Mann-Whitney test statistic is approximately normal. This test will also be used in all subsequent test statistics reported. To calculate the statistic, begin by finding the average percentage cooperation of each subject in the two samples to be compared. Pool the samples and rank them. The statistic then looks for significant differences in the rank sums across conditions. This non-parametric test is superior to tests based on means for samples of this size because it is not easily influenced by the actions of a small number (i.e. one or two) of subjects. 10 The result is similar if we consider rounds I-5 and rounds 6-io separately, with z = I-598 and z =-I *03 i respectively. 1 One curious observation from Fig. 2 is that for both computer5os and computeros cooperation actually peaks in the second or third round, rather than the first. This appears to be due to a small number of' testers', who, in early rounds of the experiment, began every io-period game by defecting in order to 'test' if they were playing a tit-for-tat opponent. However, subjects quickly learned the futility of this, and over the last half of the experiment there was very little behaviour that could be seen as testing. These testers may explain why the mean level of cooperation among the computeros is actually below that of the partners. In particular, testers in early games may have reduced the 'homemade priors' on altruism, diminishing the expected benefits to reputation building. The typical patterns of play in this experiment can be seen most clearly in Fig. 3 , where we show the final two io-period games (rounds i8i to 200) for the partners, strangers, and computer5os.12 As predicted, cooperation by the partners peaks in round one, at 86%, and stays above 50?0 for 4-6 rounds before falling to zero. For computer5os, cooperation is level at about 60-70 % for the first 8 periods, until it falls to about 7-I4%. Strangers, on the other hand, vary cooperation frequently over the ten-period set, with cooperation between 7 and 280%. Again, these patterns are consistent with the sequential equilibrium reputation hypothesis.
? Royal Economic Society
The Altruism Hypothesis
In the last subsection we saw evidence that subjects were willing to build a reputation for altruism. This leaves the more subtle question of whether some subjects actually are altruists. Evidence on this can be found in Fig. 4 . This shows the mean round of first defection for partners, computer5os and strangers.13 Contrary to the rationality hypothesis, partners and computer5os waited longer until their first defection as the experiment progressed, even in the final games. This is consistent with a hypothesis of altruism in which subjects continue to update their priors on the degree of altruism in the population throughout the experiment. Looking at the strangers, after a brief initial increase in the percent of cooperation, the mean time until first defect remained remarkably stable over the course of the experiment. This again is 13 Results similar to those in Fig. 4 obtain if the median is used. In calculating the means and medians, subjects who played all-cooperate were assumed to defect on round i i. However, there were very few such subjects. The computeros are not presented, but they were again more cooperative than strangers, but less than partners. One can also note in Fig. 4 that there is more variance among partners and computer5os than among strangers. This, probably, reflects floor effects among strangers, who are mostly choosing to defect, rather than reflecting any significant behavioural differences.
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JOURNAL [MAY consistent with the view that, after learning the distribution of altruism in the population, a stable set of cooperative players developed. Looking more closely at the strangers we can see additional evidence of altruism. If there is no real altruism, strangers should reach mutual defection at some point in the game and remain there. If there is a possibility for group reputations, then this too should be diminished as the end of the experiment approaches. As can be seen in Fig. 3 , cooperation did not deteriorate at the end of the game. In fact, a detailed look at the data shows that the general pattern of cooperation among strangers illustrated in Fig. 2 is representative of the level of cooperation throughout the entire experiment.
The fact that strangers develop a stable pattern of cooperation suggests that perhaps they may be playing a Nash equilibrium game where subjects have incomplete information about the altruism of their opponents. We can examine this hypothesis by considering the model of reciprocal altruism discussed earlier. If this were the true model, then individuals would know their own altruism parameter oc, but not their opponent's. All subjects would have prior beliefs about the distribution of oc's and would be playing a Nash equilibrium game of imperfect information. Assuming that all subjects have common priors about the distribution of types, then we can solve for a critical value of oc, oc*, such that all subjects with ot > oc* will always cooperate and all subjects with ot < oc* will always defect. Those with ot equal to oc* will, in equilibrium, choose a mixed strategy.14 Given the payoff parameters specified in Fig. i , those with oc = oc* will cooperate with probability p* = 4/ (x* -I), where o* is some positive number greater than 5 (since this is the difference between the temptation payoff I2 and the cooperation payoff 7).
The above equilibrium indicates that we should observe three types of subjects: cooperators who only cooperate, defectors who only defect, and mixers who cooperate with probability p*. Notice that this imperfect-information equilibrium imposes a certain amount of symmetry on the outcome of the game. Suppose a mixer observes cooperation with probability po > p*. Then a mixer should update his beliefs about the distribution of types and become a cooperator. Likewise, if the observed p is less thanp* the subject should become a defector. Let pm be the probability of cooperation by a mixer, and let pn be the probability of cooperation by a non-mixer, that is, cooperators and defectors combined. Define 7T as the proportion of mixers in the population. Then the probability of cooperation that a mixer actually observes, is po = 7TPm + (i -7T) pn. Since in equilibrium pm = p* and po = p*, it follows that Pn = p* in equilibrium as well. This implication of the imperfect-information equilibrium will serve the basis of our test of the model.
To examine this incomplete information equilibrium, we begin by examining the strangers condition for the last half of the experiment. By this point subjects have experience in IOO probability of cooperation in the population. Then define defectors as those subjects whose behaviour is not significantly different from a strategy of total defection. At the 9900 confidence interval, this requires defecting at least 93*7 %0 of the time. This method identifies five subjects who can be classified as defectors, with defection rates of ranging from 97 to I OO 0, and an average rate of 98 8 % defection. Defining cooperators as those whose behaviour does not significantly differ from total cooperation, we can identify one subject who cooperated 9400 at the time. Another seven subjects fell in between, and can readily be classified as mixers. These subjects cooperated from IO to 32 % of the time, and with average rate of 200 cooperation. There was one subject, subject 7, who displayed an unusual pattern of trying to use the io-round summary as a coordination device, and hence often cooperated significantly in early rounds in each io-round set. This subject had an overall level of cooperation of 420%, well above the other mixers. Hence, it is unclear whether subject 7 should be classified as a mixer or a cooperator. As a result we will present the data with both classifications of this subject, beginning with the classification as a cooperator. With this classification, we find that the average probability of cooperation result from the restart is that all conditions perform almost identically. This is true in the individual data as well as the aggregate data. In the partners group, 8 of I4 subjects chose to the optimal strategy of cooperation until the final round. In both the strangers and the computer5os, the number was 7 of I4 subjects, while the computeros had 8 subjects choose the optimal strategy.17 The restart shows that the level of sophistication of subjects in all conditions was about the same. For instance, strangers, who had no experience with the finitely repeated play, were just as successful at exploiting the computer strategy as were the computer5os, who had experience playing tit-for-tat opponents. Hence, while subjects generally exhibit behaviour consistent with the sequential equilibrium prediction in the main experiment, the restart shows that they do not uniformly demonstate the strategic sophistication that we ascribe to sequential equilibrium players in theory.
IV. CONCLUSION
This paper presented experiments designed to examine the sequential equilibrium reputation hypothesis in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma. Our results support the sequential equilibrium prediction. Subjects in a finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma were significantly more cooperative than subjects in a repeated single-shot game. Moreover, by increasing subjects' beliefs about the probability that their opponent is altruistic, we can further increase reputation building. Several findings in the experiment suggest that, rather than simply believing that some subjects may be altruistic, many subjects actually are altruistic. Play in the repeated single-shot game is consistent with a model of warm-glow in which people get additional utility from mutual cooperation, and our results suggest that there is a stable fraction of such altruists in the population. The evolution of play in the repeated games is also consistent with the altruism hypothesis. Rather than defecting earlier in each of the series of repeated games, subjects continue to increase their waiting time until their first defection, even as the experiment nears the end.
In summary, subjects appear very willing to build reputations for altruisms. However, it seems important to the observed play of the game that some subjects actually are altruists. In contrast to the strict, purely rational, version of the reputation building hypothesis, there may be no real difference in the beliefs that an opponent is an altruist and the actual chance it is so.
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Sets of Rounds
You will play the one-round game just described in io one-round sets. That is, each set of play will consist of Io one-round games. To begin a set of rounds, the computer (C Royal Economic-Society I 993 584 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL [MAY will randomly match you with another player in the room. You will then play the one-round game just described with the same playerfor a total of IO rounds. That is, all i o rounds in the set will be played with the same other player. After the i oth round a new set will begin. The computer will randomly reassign you to play with another player: every io rounds you will be randomly reassigned to a new subject. You will never be assigned to play with the same person for more than io rounds.
Reminder: During each io-round set, you will be playing each one-round game with the same other player for all IO rounds.
At the end of each round, the computer will tell you your move in the last round, the other player's move, and your earnings from that round. At the end of each set, the computer will tell you your total earnings for the entire io-round set.
We will play this game for a total of 20 sets of io rounds each. That is, there will be 20 sets, and each will have io decision rounds. Thus, during the course of the experiment you will play a total of 200 one-round games.
Computer Players At the beginning of every set there is a chance that you will be randomly paired with a computer player, rather than a fellow participant in the experiment. For every i0-round set, the chance that you will be paired with a computer player is I/2. That is, there is a 50 0 chance that you will be assigned the computer player. If you are not paired with the computer, you will be matched with another person in the experiment.
Computer Moves
The computer player is always programmed to use a very simple 'copy cat' rule. The computer will start every i o-round set by choosing LEFT. After that the computer will make the same choice that you made on the previous round. For example, if you choose LEFT on round i, the computer will choose LEFT on round 2. If you choose RIGHT on round 2, the computer will choose RIGHT on round 3. And so on.
Confidentiality
Your identity in the experiment will not be made known to any other participant at any time in the experiment. Your decisions and payoffs are confidential.
Do not discuss your choices or payoffs with any other player! Thank you and Good Luck!
